UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/49/510
S/1994/1158
13 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 142
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 13 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the grave situation created by the abduction of Israel Defence Forces Corporal Nachshon Waxman by Palestinian terrorists affiliated with the Hamas organization.

According to intelligence sources, Corporal Waxman is being held captive in the Gaza Strip. In accordance with the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and with the subsequent Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed by the parties, the responsibility for the life, welfare and safe return of Corporal Waxman lies with the Palestinian Authority.

The Israeli Cabinet held a special meeting yesterday, in which Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin briefed the Cabinet on the abduction of Corporal Waxman and on the Prime Minister's contacts with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization regarding this issue.

Hamas, which also claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Jerusalem four days ago in which 2 people were killed and 13 wounded (see A/49/498-S/1994/1150), is inspired by a radical, fundamentalist ideology. It has repeatedly declared its commitment to opposing the peace process by violent means, and to carrying out acts of terrorism directed against Israel and Israelis. Israel calls upon the international community to combat the fundamentalist terrorist threat posed by Hamas and similar organizations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 142, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gad YAACOBI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1159
13 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

With reference to your letter dated 1 August 1994 (S/1994/923) on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list of equipment which the Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to offer for use in UNAMIR.

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Chong-Ha YOO
Permanent Representative

Annex

List of equipment

20 Jeeps (Korando; capacity of 5 persons per vehicle)

10 Minibuses (Hyundai; capacity of 15 persons per vehicle)

Spare parts

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1994/1160
14 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 937 (1994), of 21 July 1994, in which the Council requested, inter alia, a report within three months of that adoption date on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, and on the implementation of all aspects of the agreements mentioned in the resolution.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. A further round of negotiations convened by my Special Envoy for Georgia, with the objective of making progress towards a comprehensive settlement, took place at Geneva from 31 August to 2 September 1994. The negotiations revolved around refugee issues, military aspects concerning the Kodori valley and political matters.

3. Regarding refugee matters, a statement was signed by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides recognizing that returnees would be informed through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about the Abkhaz requirement to comply with the laws in force in Abkhazia. Regarding political questions, both sides were given a non-paper outlining political and legal elements for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, which had been drafted by my Special Envoy in collaboration with representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Russian Federation. My Special Envoy has invited both sides to respond officially to the proposals contained in the paper at the next round of negotiations, which are now scheduled to take place at Geneva in the last week of October 1994.

4. The Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, met with the Abkhaz leader, Mr. Vladislav Ardzinba, in the presence of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Mr. Pavel Grachev, at Abkhazia on 16 September 1994. The two sides reportedly discussed, among other issues, developments during the previous few days when tensions had arisen as a result of the wish of refugees to return to their houses and the refusal of the Abkhaz

side to accept them. The President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, met with Mr. Shevardnadze on 19 September at Sochi, Russian Federation, on the same subject matter.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

5. The parties to the Quadripartite Agreement continue to demonstrate commitment to a negotiated process leading to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. Differences remain, particularly regarding conditions and the rhythm of repatriation. However, during the 8th meeting of the Quadripartite Commission, which took place at Sochi, Russian Federation, on 28 September 1994, the parties reached a consensus on the need to restore the necessary security conditions in the area where the refugees are to return and on the choice of adequate measures to do so. Following that meeting, the Abkhaz authorities accepted the first group of 100 repatriation applications concerning 460 persons, out of a total of approximately 7,000 applications concerning 26,000 persons.

6. In August 1994, a mission from United Nations Headquarters undertook an assessment of the mine situation in the area. There are some 75,000 to 150,000 mines between the Gumista and Inguri Rivers (see map annexed to the present report). Mines are still being laid, especially in the Gali region, thus spreading fear among the returnees and hampering the operations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). A mine awareness education programme aimed at improving security conditions is under preparation. The success of that programme will require full cooperation of the parties with UNHCR.

7. The security situation in the Gali region has been precarious. A number of ambushes by unknown assailants have taken place, costing the lives of CIS peace-keepers, Abkhaz militia and civilians. These activities underline the relative fragility of agreements on refugees reached so far.

8. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 10 of its resolution 937 (1994), I have established a voluntary fund for contributions in support of the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994, between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities (S/1994/583 and Corr.1, annex) and/or for humanitarian programmes, including de-mining, as specified by the donors, which will in particular facilitate the implementation of the mandate of UNOMIG. I have also informed Member States of the establishment of this fund.

IV. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA

9. In resolution 937 (1994), the Security Council authorized an increase in the strength of UNOMIG, as required, up to 136 military observers. The Council also extended the mandate of UNOMIG to 13 January 1995 and expanded it to undertake a number of tasks related to the 14 May Agreement.

10. UNOMIG has been fulfilling its tasks as mandated by the Security Council. It has been operating in the security and restricted weapons zones and in the Kodori valley, and has been monitoring the weapons storage sites on both sides. Patrols to the security zone and the Kodori valley are conducted either by UNOMIG personnel or jointly with personnel from the CIS peace-keeping force.

11. UNOMIG strength as at 12 October was 90 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs). UNOMIG has maintained its headquarters at Sukhumi but, owing to the unavailability of suitable accommodation in that city, part of the Mission's headquarters staff are now stationed in Pitsunda, 85 kilometres north of Sukhumi. Three sector headquarters have also been established - at Sukhumi, Gali and Zugdidi. The liaison office at Tbilisi should be in place by 1 November.

12. The UNMOs are receiving cooperation from both the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. They have full freedom of movement and access to communications and inspection and other facilities necessary for them to perform their tasks. There have been occasions when the UNMOs were denied access to certain locations, but these were isolated incidents, which were resolved in all cases. The security and safety of the UNMOs has also been satisfactory, though certain risks exist because of mines.

13. I have initiated an exchange of letters with the Government of Georgia with a view to concluding an agreement on the status of UNOMIG. I expect that such an agreement will be concluded in the near future.

14. The Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG has met a number of times with representatives of CSCE. CSCE intends to station two liaison officers close to UNOMIG headquarters.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. Security and restricted weapons zones

15. The Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities have largely complied with the 14 May Agreement. All armed forces and heavy military equipment have been withdrawn from the security zone, and no heavy military equipment remains in the restricted weapons zone. Scattered attempts by both sides to reintroduce heavy military equipment in the latter were made, but such equipment has been withdrawn after protest from UNOMIG. A large number of inhabitants in both the security and restricted weapons zones still carry hand-held weapons. UNOMIG assesses that depots of weapons and ammunition exist in both zones but these are difficult to locate.

16. Council members will recall that paragraph 2 (a) of the 14 May Agreement allows "police/militia" in the security and restricted zones to carry personal arms. However, as the phrase "personal arms" was not defined in the 14 May Agreement, there is a difference of opinion between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities as to the type of personal arms to be allowed in the restricted weapons and security zones. The Abkhaz police (known as militia) carry automatic rifles whereas the Georgian police carry pistols.

17. All volunteer formations from outside the boundaries of Abkhazia have been disbanded. There remains, however, a number of individuals from beyond Abkhazia serving with the Abkhaz armed forces. These individuals claim to have "Abkhaz citizenship".

B. Kodori valley

18. As stipulated in the 14 May Agreement, troops of the Republic of Georgia were withdrawn from the Kodori valley to their places of deployment beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia as confirmed by UNOMIG, which has been conducting bi-weekly two-day patrols in the area. Some non-operational military equipment was left behind.

19. With the agreement of both sides, the CIS peace-keeping force has established an observation post at Lata, on the south-western side of the valley, and another at Azhara, on the north-eastern side.

20. The inhabitants of the valley (called the Svanetians) have been concerned about their safety in view of the Abkhaz authorities' stated intention to establish civil authority in the valley and their decision to try, under Abkhaz law, all Svanetians who had fought on the Georgian side. The Svanetians are known to have weapons, including hand-held air defence missiles, and they may also have some mortars.

21. The Abkhaz authorities, who hold front-line positions in the Kodori valley, assert that Georgian troops and military equipment remain in the valley and they have at times used that argument to delay negotiations over the return of refugees. In view of that situation the CIS peace-keeping force has organized a number of meetings between representatives of the Government of Georgia, the Abkhaz authorities and Svanetian leaders. Most of these meetings have taken place in the presence of UNOMIG representatives.

22. On 5 October, the CIS peace-keeping force started a so-called "search and explain" operation in the valley aimed at confirming to the Abkhaz authorities that the Government of Georgia had complied with the 14 May Agreement; informing the Svanetians of the details of the Agreement; disarming the Svanetians (without conducting house searches); and repairing the main road leading into the valley.

23. The Svanetians are particularly concerned over the repair of the main road, which could in their view facilitate an Abkhaz attack on the valley. They have now agreed hesitantly to the repair in view of assurances from the CIS peace-keeping force that a checkpoint, manned by themselves and by Svanetian representatives, will be established at the repaired part of the road in the centre of the valley. The Abkhaz authorities have announced their intention to move their troops to the boundaries of Abkhazia as soon as the search and explain operation is completed and the main road is repaired. They have, however, assured the Svanetians that tney will not be mistreated.

24. The search and explain operation has been proceeding as planned. A number of mines, artillery pieces and other ammunition were found, mostly on the Abkhaz

side of the valley. The operation, which should be completed in the near future, is being monitored by military observers from UNOMIG, the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. On 8 October, Svanetian observers also took part in monitoring the operation.

C. The situation at Sukhumi

25. At Sukhumi, the situation has generally been calm, but the crime rate is high. The Abkhaz authorities have been attempting to curb criminality but have so far been unsuccessful. UNOMIG has received complaints, largely from non-Abkhaz families, that crimes are directed against them.

VI. COOPERATION BETWEEN UNOMIG AND THE CIS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

26. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force, as described in my report of 12 July (S/1994/818, paras. 14-17), has been proceeding in a satisfactory manner. UNOMIG has also received practical support from the CIS force when its resources have not been sufficient.

27. As requested by the Security Council, I have initiated an exchange of letters with the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of CIS to establish an appropriate arrangement on the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force as regards the 14 May Agreement.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

28. It is now over a year since the fighting that led to the flight of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons from Abkhazia. There is no doubt that, despite strenuous efforts by my Special Envoy and others, political progress has been very slow. The Abkhaz unwillingness to accept an early return of refugees has created significant difficulties and has contributed to holding up progress on other questions. I hope that sufficient agreement has now been reached to achieve progress on the refugee question. If so, it will allow my Special Envoy to concentrate his efforts on negotiating the political status of Abkhazia which is a core question of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict. Without advances in these areas, tensions will continue to rise to the detriment of both sides.

Map No. 3837 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
September 1994

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
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S/1994/1161
14 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 51

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

QUESTION OF CYPRUS

Letter dated 11 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 11 October 1994 addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of that letter and its annex, which contains the statement made by H.E. Mr. Atay A. Raşit, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 3 October 1994 in response to the speech delivered by Mr. Glafcos Clerides, leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, to the General Assembly, could be circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 October 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the statement made on 3 October 1994 by H.E. Mr. Ahmet Atay Raşit, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in response to the speech made by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, to the General Assembly on 3 October 1994 (see A/49/PV.14).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix

Mr. Clerides claims that the Turkish Cypriot side is intransigent and cites the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1994 as evidence (see S/1994/629). However, he conveniently totally ignores the Secretary-General's subsequent report (in the form of a letter dated 28 June 1994) (S/1994/785) in which the Secretary-General clearly states that considerable progress was achieved on the Turkish Cypriot side towards acceptance of the package of confidence-building measures, and that it was the Greek Cypriot side that was not prepared to accept the package as a whole, including the clarifications agreed in Vienna and Nicosia. Mr. Clerides has even gone so far as to declare the package dead, and resorted to blackmailing tactics, threatening resignation if forced to accept the implementation of the confidence-building measures.

Mr. Clerides advances the hypocritical and insincere argument that the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community is essentially its own fault and that of Turkey. He deliberately fails to mention, however, that the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot State is the ultimate result of the forcible expulsion by the Greek Cypriots of the entire Turkish Cypriot element from the State mechanism of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus as from December 1963 and their campaign to take over Cyprus by force, culminating in the Greek coup d'état of 15 July 1974. The Turkish Cypriots were even more isolated during the tragic years between 1963 and 1974, when they lived as virtual prisoners in their enclaves scattered around the island, the total area of which was no larger than a mere 3 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. It should also be mentioned that Turkey was not even on the scene in Cyprus during that time, a fact that indicates that the present isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community has nothing to do with Turkey's presence, but is the work of the Greek Cypriot side and its inhuman embargo. In fact Turkey, in addition to guaranteeing the security of the Turkish Cypriots, is the only country helping us to overcome the suffering of our people as a result of the Greek Cypriot embargo.

Mr. Clerides puts forward the precondition that the basis of a future solution must first of all be established before confidence-building measures can be taken up. It is obvious that the "basis" that Mr. Clerides talks about is a return to the unacceptable conditions that prevailed before 1974. That "basis" has been tried and not only failed but also proved to be disastrous for Cyprus and dangerous for the peace of the region as a whole.

The procedure envisaged by Mr. Clerides, namely the prior discussion of the overall issue rather than confidence-building measures, is quite simply putting the cart before the horse, since the Secretary-General himself has also stated in his recent relevant reports that it is the deep crisis of confidence that is obstructing progress towards an overall solution in Cyprus and that such a solution would be greatly facilitated if a series of confidence-building measures was implemented.

Mr. Clerides' well-known rhetoric about alleged "invasion and occupation" adds insult to injury since it was Greece that had occupied Cyprus between 1963 and 1974. He has now added a new phrase to this rhetoric with the term "ethnic cleansing". It is Mr. Clerides' own side and own administration that is guilty

of all the above charges, since it was they who unleashed the first "ethnic cleansing" campaign in the second half of the twentieth century by massacring and driving out the Turkish Cypriots from their homes and properties as well as the bicommunal Government during the attacks against us in 1963 aimed at annexing Cyprus to Greece, under the notorious "Akritas plan".

Mr. Clerides' propaganda regarding "demilitarization" is clearly aimed at depriving the Turkish Cypriot people of the only effective means of security, which is the presence of the Turkish peace force under the Treaty of Guarantee. This proposition is not only totally unrealistic but is also utterly insincere, since even in 1963 the Turkish Cypriots were attacked not by regular military forces, but by armed militia, underground armed elements and paramilitary forces relying on the numerical advantage of the Greek Cypriot community vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot people are not prepared to put themselves in a position of vulnerability ever again under the pretence of "demilitarization", especially in the present conditions of a total lack of trust and confidence between the two communities.

We have instead proposed a non-aggression agreement between the two sides and, if Mr. Clerides is sincere, he would respond positively to this serious and constructive proposal.

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14 October 1994
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 52

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF AND AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT

Letter dated 14 October 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the final declaration issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its eighteenth special session, held on Wednesday, 12 October 1994, in response to a request by the State of Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 52, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gaafar ALLAGANY
Ambassador

ANNEX

Final declaration issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its eighteenth special session

At its eighteenth special session, the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council issued the following press release:

On 12 October 1994, the Ministerial Council held its eighteenth special session at the request of the State of Kuwait.

The meeting was presided over by His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and President of the current session of the Ministerial Council. Also in attendance were:

H.E. Mr. Rashid Abdullah Al-Noaimi
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates

H.E. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Bahrain

H.E. Mr. Yousef Bin Al-Alawi Bin Abdullah
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar

H.E. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait.

The Council has followed with great interest developments in the region in the light of the provocative presence of a substantial concentration of Iraqi troops on the border of Kuwait and recent threats made by the Iraqi regime against the security and sovereignty of the State of Kuwait. The Ministerial Council strongly condemns these irresponsible practices, which seriously threaten the sovereignty of one of its member States, show clear contempt for international law and international instruments, and constitute a flagrant violation of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and the terms of the cease-fire established by resolution 687 (1991) and accepted unconditionally by Iraq. It reaffirms that the practices of the Iraqi regime constitute a direct threat to the security and stability of the member States.

The Council condemns the Iraqi regime, which persists in its threats to use force against Kuwait and the member States of the Council, is creating an atmosphere of tension and anxiety in the region, and is endangering regional peace and security. Basing itself on the principle of collective security and common destiny, and recalling in that connection the resolutions adopted by the leaders of the member States of the Council confirming that any aggression against one of the member States constitutes an aggression against all of them and that their security constitutes an indivisible whole, the Council reaffirms that its member States unreservedly support Kuwait in any measure that it may take to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Ministerial Council calls upon the Security Council to assume its responsibilities under its resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993) by taking a firm stand with regard to the Iraqi regime, with a view to putting an end to the regime's threats to the sovereignty of the State of Kuwait and to regional security. It also requests the Security Council to take the necessary measures to stop the Iraqi regime from periodically threatening regional security and stability, so as to guarantee the primacy of international law and the stability of security and peace.

The Ministerial Council expresses its profound gratitude to the fraternal and friendly States which have condemned the Iraqi regime's aggressive policy towards Kuwait and the consequent threat to security in the region. It further expresses its great satisfaction to those friendly States which have promptly deployed forces in the region in order to reinforce Kuwait's defensive capabilities. It welcomes the positive results of the two meetings which it had with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Douglas Hurd. Those meetings afforded the parties an opportunity to reiterate their determination to resist the Iraqi threats. The Ministerial Council also welcomes the statement by the United Nations Security Council on 8 October 1994, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait.

The Ministerial Council calls on the Iraqi regime to withdraw the forces it has deployed on its frontier with the State of Kuwait, to implement all Security Council resolutions regarding its aggression against the State of Kuwait, to comply with the conditions and measures set out in resolution 687 (1991), particularly those regarding respect for the sovereignty of Kuwait, to recognize the frontiers between the State of Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with resolution 833 (1993), and to release all prisoners of war and other persons in detention, whether nationals of Kuwait or of other countries.

The Ministerial Council expresses its sympathy with the Iraqi people in the hardships it was experiencing, and holds the Iraqi regime responsible for those hardships because of its refusal to implement Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) regarding the needs of the Iraqi people for food and medicines. The Ministerial Council reaffirms its determination to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, in the interests of stability and security in the region.

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19 October 1994
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 52

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF
AND AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT

Letter dated 14 October 1994 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the final declaration issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its eighteenth special session, held on Wednesday, 12 October 1994, in response to a request by the State of Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 52, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gaafar ALLAGANY
Ambassador

* Reissued for technical reasons.

ANNEX

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The meeting was presided over by His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and President of the current session of the Ministerial Council. Also in attendance were:

H.E. Mr. Rashid Abdullah Al-Noaimi
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates

H.E. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Bahrain

H.E. Mr. Yousef Bin Alawi Bin Abdullah
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman

H.E. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar

H.E. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait.

The Council has followed with great interest developments in the region in the light of the provocative presence of a substantial concentration of Iraqi troops on the border of Kuwait and recent threats made by the Iraqi regime against the security and sovereignty of the State of Kuwait. The Ministerial Council strongly condemns these irresponsible practices, which seriously threaten the sovereignty of one of its member States, show clear contempt for international law and international instruments, and constitute a flagrant violation of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Iraqi aggression against the State of Kuwait and the terms of the cease-fire established by resolution 687 (1991) and accepted unconditionally by Iraq. It reaffirms that the practices of the Iraqi regime constitute a direct threat to the security and stability of the member States.

The Council condemns the Iraqi regime, which persists in its threats to use force against Kuwait and the member States of the Council, is creating an atmosphere of tension and anxiety in the region, and is endangering regional peace and security. Basing itself on the principle of collective security and common destiny, and recalling in that connection the resolutions adopted by the leaders of the member States of the Council confirming that any aggression against one of the member States constitutes an aggression against all of them and that their security constitutes an indivisible whole, the Council reaffirms

that its member States unreservedly support Kuwait in any measure that it may take to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Ministerial Council calls upon the Security Council to assume its responsibilities under its resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993) by taking a firm stand with regard to the Iraqi regime, with a view to putting an end to the regime's threats to the sovereignty of the State of Kuwait and to regional security. It also requests the Security Council to take the necessary measures to stop the Iraqi regime from periodically threatening regional security and stability, so as to guarantee the primacy of international law and the stability of security and peace.

The Ministerial Council expresses its profound gratitude to the fraternal and friendly States which have condemned the Iraqi regime's aggressive policy towards Kuwait and the consequent threat to security in the region. It further expresses its great satisfaction to those friendly States which have promptly deployed forces in the region in order to reinforce Kuwait's defensive capabilities. It welcomes the positive results of the two meetings which it had with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Douglas Hurd. Those meetings afforded the parties an opportunity to reiterate their determination to resist the Iraqi threats. The Ministerial Council also welcomes the statement by the United Nations Security Council on 8 October 1994, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait.

The Ministerial Council calls on the Iraqi regime to withdraw the forces it has deployed on its frontier with the State of Kuwait, to implement all Security Council resolutions regarding its aggression against the State of Kuwait, to comply with the conditions and measures set out in resolution 687 (1991), particularly those regarding respect for the sovereignty of Kuwait, to recognize the frontiers between the State of Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with resolution 833 (1993), and to release all prisoners of war and other persons in detention, whether nationals of Kuwait or of other countries.

The Ministerial Council expresses its sympathy with the Iraqi people in the hardships it was experiencing, and holds the Iraqi regime responsible for those hardships because of its refusal to implement Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) regarding the needs of the Iraqi people for food and medicines. The Ministerial Council reaffirms its determination to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, in the interests of stability and security in the region.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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General

S/1994/1163
15 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Argentina, Canada, Djibouti, France, Pakistan, Spain, United States of America and Venezuela: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the provisions of its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16 October 1993, 905 (1994) of 23 March 1994, 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, 933 (1994) of 30 June 1994, 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994 and 944 (1994) of 29 September 1994,

Recalling the terms of the Governors Island Agreement (S/26063) and the related Pact of New York (S/26297),

Recalling also the different positions taken by its members when resolution 940 (1994) was adopted,

Looking forward to the completion of the mission of the Multinational Force in Haiti (MNF) and to the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) as soon as a secure and stable environment is established, as foreseen in resolution 940 (1994),

Having received the reports of the MNF, dated 26 September 1994 (S/1994/1107, annex) and 10 October 1994 (S/1994/1148, annex),

Having also received the report of the Secretary-General of 28 September 1994 (S/1994/1143), submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 917 (1994),

Welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General (S/1994/1169), confirming that President Aristide has returned to Haiti,

1. Welcomes with great satisfaction the return to Haiti of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 15 October 1994 and expresses its confidence that the people of Haiti can now begin to rebuild their country with dignity and consolidate democracy in a spirit of national reconciliation;

2. Welcomes in particular that, with the convening of the Haitian Parliament and the departure of the military leadership, the process of implementing the Governors Island Agreement, the New York Pact, and the objectives of the United Nations as expressed in the resolutions of the Council is well under way;

3. Expresses full support for efforts by President Aristide, democratic leaders in Haiti, and the legitimate organs of the restored government to bring Haiti out of crisis and return it to the democratic community of nations;

4. Commends the efforts of all States, organizations and individuals who have contributed to this outcome;

5. Recognizes in particular the efforts of the MNF, authorized under resolution 940 (1994), and those of the Member States participating in the MNF on behalf of the international community in creating the conditions necessary for the return of democracy to the people of Haiti;

6. Expresses its support for the deployment of the advance team of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to complete the composition of UNMIH;

7. Notes that under the terms of resolution 940 (1994) UNMIH will replace the MNF when the Security Council determines that a secure and stable environment has been established;

8. Welcomes the appointment of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and thanks the former Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organization of American States for his efforts;

9. Urges that cooperation continue between the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, especially regarding the rapid return to Haiti of the members of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH);

10. Welcomes the fact that, now that President Aristide has returned to Haiti, sanctions will be lifted in accordance with resolution 944 (1994);

11. Reaffirms the willingness of the international community to provide assistance to the people of Haiti, with the expectation that they will do their utmost to rebuild their country;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1164
15 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Argentina, France, Oman, Rwanda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, and reaffirming resolutions 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991 and 833 (1993) of 27 May 1993, and in particular paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990),

Recalling that Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations forms the basis of the cease-fire,

Noting past Iraqi threats and instances of actual use of force against its neighbours,

Recognizing that any hostile or provocative action directed against its neighbours by the Government of Iraq constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Welcoming all diplomatic and other efforts to resolve the crisis,

Determined to prevent Iraq from resorting to threats and intimidation of its neighbours and the United Nations,

Underlining that it will consider Iraq fully responsible for the serious consequences of any failure to fulfil the demands in the present resolution,

Noting that Iraq has affirmed its readiness to resolve in a positive manner the issue of recognizing Kuwait's sovereignty and its borders as endorsed by resolution 833 (1993), but underlining that Iraq must unequivocally commit itself by full and formal constitutional procedures to respect Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and borders, as required by resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993),

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq,

Reaffirming its statement of 8 October 1994 (S/1994/PRST/58),

Taking note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait of 6 October 1994 (S/1994/1137), regarding the statement by the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 6 October 1994,

Taking note also of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq of 10 October 1994 (S/1994/1149), announcing that the Government of Iraq had decided to withdraw the troops recently deployed in the direction of the border with Kuwait,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait;

2. Demands that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions;

3. Demands that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq;

4. Demands therefore that Iraq not redeploy to the south the units referred to in paragraph 2 above or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq;

5. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1165
14 October 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 OCTOBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith the statement issued by the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers following the extraordinary meeting held this afternoon in Kuwait to discuss the latest developments in the most recent Iraqi military threat to the State of Kuwait and the States of the region, and the media reports concerning the statement issued yesterday evening after the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the head of the Iraqi regime in Baghdad.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad Abdullah ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

The Council of Ministers held an extraordinary meeting this afternoon in the Al-Sha'b Palace under the chairmanship of the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdulla Al-Salem Al-Sabah, and in the presence of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Ahmad Abd al-Aziz al-Saadun.

The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Minister of Planning, Abd al-Aziz Dakhil al-Dakhil, stated that the Council had discussed at the meeting the latest developments in the most recent military threats and provocation by the troops of the Iraqi regime against the State of Kuwait and the States of the region, which are a further link in the chain of continuous violations of Security Council resolutions perpetrated by the Iraqi regime.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Council of Ministers welcomed the statements by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and friendly States, whose content denoted their full awareness of the aggressive intentions of the Iraqi regime and its attempts to circumvent Security Council resolutions and reflected the desire of those States to lay solid foundations for security, stability and peace in the region.

The Council also took cognizance of media reports concerning the statement issued yesterday evening after the meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation with the head of the Iraqi regime in Baghdad. The State of Kuwait, while appreciating the efforts of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, to persuade the Iraqi regime to implement all Security Council resolutions relating to its aggression against the State of Kuwait, considers that the persistent mobilization of Iraqi military forces in their current positions continues to pose a serious threat to its security and sovereignty, given the Iraqi regime's aggressive intentions vis-à-vis the State of Kuwait and the States of the region, which have been confirmed by the recent escalation and repeated statements by the representatives and the various media of the Iraqi regime. Continued strengthening of military coordination in fraternal and friendly States is essential to oppose these threats.

The State of Kuwait also considers that the talk of lifting the economic sanctions imposed on the Iraqi regime contrived by the latter following the recent escalation represents a reward for its action and encouragement to continue violating Security Council resolutions. The State of Kuwait, reaffirming that the regime in question cannot be trusted and will not cease to repeat its threats when the opportunity presents itself, requests the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility to put an end to the violations and threats of the Iraqi regime against the State of Kuwait and the States of the region by taking effective steps under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to guarantee the security of Kuwait, respect for its sovereignty and independence and the integrity of its international frontiers, and the security of the States of the region. Kuwait also affirms that the sincere intentions to create a climate of peace and stability and good-neighbourly relations in the region can only be put into practice through a serious and full commitment to the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1166
14 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Part Two

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In my report of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1068), which gave a factual account of recent developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields, I indicated that I would submit by mid-October a second part of the report covering my assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and making recommendations regarding the future of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). I also indicated that the second part would draw upon the results of the visit to Somalia being undertaken at that time by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the above. It covers developments up to 11 October 1994.

2. In its resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, the Security Council, having noted my intention to submit to the Council a second part of the report along the lines stated above, decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994 and encouraged me to continue with and intensify preparations of contingency arrangements for the implementation of possible decisions, including withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame. The present report accordingly includes recommendations relating to such contingency arrangements.

II. VISIT TO SOMALIA OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

3. I asked the Under-Secretary-General to travel to Somalia to review with my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNOSOM II the operation's needs during this critical phase and to assess progress concerning national reconciliation. He was accompanied by my Military Adviser, Major General J. M. G. Baril.

4. The Under-Secretary-General met with many Somali leaders, including General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mr. Ali Mahdi, Spokesman for the group of 12 Somali factions, Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Tur",

Chairman of the Somali National Movement (SNM), Imam Mohamoud Imam Omar, the Imam of Hirab, and General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqliqato", Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference. He stressed the importance of moving the process of political reconciliation forward in order to achieve the objectives of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 (see S/26317) and the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I). He emphasized that the resources of the international community were not unlimited and that the commitment to assist Somalia could not be sustained indefinitely if the Somali leaders were unable to reach a compromise and set their country on the road to peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

5. The Under-Secretary-General reported to me that he had found the Somali leaders he met quite keen on the establishment of a transitional government to fill the political vacuum that had existed for so long in Somalia. He had stressed to them that the achievement of such a significant step in the process of political reconciliation could be brought about only by compromise and good will among the leaders in order to save their country from sliding back into the abyss. Any attempt by one person to dominate the Somali political scene could only lead to a repetition of the recent history, turmoil, suffering and destruction in Somalia. It was, therefore, imperative for all Somalis to work together to achieve political stability in their country.

6. The Somali leaders took the position that significant developments regarding the political process were taking place within the framework of national reconciliation. At that time, they expected, with the assistance of UNOSOM, to convene before the end of September the long-delayed preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference called for under the Nairobi Declaration of March 1994, to be followed by the National Reconciliation Conference in early October 1994. The Conference would be expected to conclude its deliberations during the third week of October. The Somali leaders further expected the National Reconciliation Conference to appoint a transitional government and to examine proposals relating to the establishment of a federal system of government. They indicated that that approach enjoyed wide support among the various political factions, including those from the north-west, as it would provide some autonomy to the regions of Somalia. Some Somali leaders also thought it desirable to have the transitional government establish a national Somali army. The Under-Secretary-General emphasized that, in order to achieve durable political reconciliation, the transitional government would have to be a broad-based one.

7. On the question of security of troops, the faction leaders were informed that attacks on United Nations peace-keepers and personnel, including staff of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations property, would not be tolerated. The faction leaders were also informed that the United Nations expected them to take measures to deter militia under their control from mounting such attacks and to investigate the incidents and punish the perpetrators. The Under-Secretary-General also informed the leaders that UNOSOM would react vigorously against any attack or harassment directed against it and other international personnel and property.

III. PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

8. During their meeting at Mogadishu on 16 September 1994, the leader of SNA, General Aidid, informed the Under-Secretary-General that it was now the view of SNA that the ongoing consultations within the Hawiye clan provided a sufficient basis for the political process in Somalia to proceed directly to the convening of the preparatory meeting at the end of September, to be followed immediately by the National Reconciliation Conference, which should not last more than three weeks. General Aidid contended that that new position of SNA made the convening of the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference unnecessary.

9. The reactions of the leaders of the other Hawiye subclans to this development have been mixed. Mr. Ali Mahdi, who was originally reluctant to participate in the clan conference but was eventually persuaded to do so, expressed his surprise. The Imam of Hirab, for his part, wanted more time for consultations. As at the time of writing of this report, the preparations for a Hawiye Reconciliation Conference, of which so much had been expected, had not begun. Given the hopes placed in the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference, the proposal to bypass it would seem to be a negative development.

10. As for the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference, my Special Representative has reported that General Aidid is insisting on convening the former himself. For their part, Mr. Ali Mahdi and the group of 12 have insisted that invitations for both the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference should be issued by my Special Representative and they have made it clear that they would not attend any meeting convened by General Aidid. However, as a result of extensive negotiations which Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has held with both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, my Special Representative has recently been informed that General Aidid has now agreed in principle to UNOSOM issuing the invitations for the preparatory meeting. General Aidid's decision is expected to be confirmed in writing in the next few days. My Special Representative will continue to extend all possible support to the efforts of the Somali parties.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

11. Humanitarian relief organizations have continued to provide support for the most vulnerable segments of the population wherever conditions of access and security allow. Under normal conditions of internal stability, security and governance, international assistance to Somalia would now be dedicated to recovery and reconstruction programmes. Unfortunately, in most regions rehabilitation interventions have had to favour ad hoc small-scale projects rather than district or regional reconstruction and development plans, because of continued insecurity and the lack of progress in the political reconciliation process. These conditions have also prevented the realization of expectations generated by the formation of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and the United Nations Development Office. While some of the major humanitarian objectives have been met, any natural or man-made disaster in Somalia could result in a renewed massive emergency, given the absence of indigenous institutions with adequate organizational capacity and financial resources. In most regions, basic community services (health, water, education) would not be sustained

without external support. It is essential, therefore, that relief programmes for the most vulnerable segments of the population, support for basic community services and food security and nutritional surveillance programmes be continued. In addition, the repatriation of some 500,000 refugees and the resettlement of up to 400,000 internally displaced persons must be tackled as soon as possible.

12. As I have indicated in previous reports, UNOSOM troops continue to fulfil an important role in providing security for humanitarian organizations and their activities. While the geographical area where they can support humanitarian operations has recently been reduced significantly, the protection of key installations, such as the seaports and airports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa, and the provision of military escorts are of vital importance to continued humanitarian work in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The recent pattern of extending the UNOSOM mandate from month to month and the continuing uncertainty about the Mission's future have made planning difficult and have increased the vulnerability of relief personnel and supplies to attacks and looting.

13. At its most recent meeting, on 23 September 1994, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee expressed its concern about deteriorating security. It is the considered view of the representatives of United Nations organizations and other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that, in the absence of a political settlement, humanitarian organizations will not be able to continue their current programmes without the support of UNOSOM troops. As the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops approaches, it will be increasingly difficult to provide the necessary protection for humanitarian programmes. In most areas, withdrawal would oblige humanitarian organizations to evacuate international relief personnel, though in some cases they might be able to return after negotiating security and operational arrangements with local authorities. However, experience has shown that such ad hoc arrangements can be extremely tenuous. Even if they were to hold, access and delivery problems would probably be experienced when key installations and entry points were no longer secured.

V. PARAMETERS FOR UNOSOM REDUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL

14. It will be recalled that, following the completion of the operation undertaken by the Unified Task Force and the transition from that Force to UNOSOM II in May 1993, it was envisaged that the international community's remaining tasks would be carried out within a specified period of time. The Somali political organizations and factions had committed themselves in the Addis Ababa Agreement to a political process which would run for a two-year transitional period, effective from the date of signature of the Agreement, that is until March 1995. During this period, transitional governing mechanisms would be established whose primary objective would be to foster the reconciliation of the Somali people by building up its democratic institutions, restoring the machinery of government at the national, regional and district levels, completing disarmament and launching a programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. In the Addis Ababa Agreement, the leaders of the Somali organizations and factions had called on the United Nations and the international community to assist the people of Somalia in achieving those objectives. When the Security Council decided to accept the

Somali leaders' call for assistance, it was envisaged that the two-year transitional period would be the time-frame within which the mission of UNOSOM II would be completed. This objective was reaffirmed in Council resolutions 865 (1993), 897 (1994) and 923 (1994).

15. As endorsed by the Security Council in a presidential statement of 12 August 1994, a gradual reduction of UNOSOM's strength is under way. By the end of October 1994, its force level will have been reduced to 15,000 all ranks. The deployment and capabilities of the reduced force will be concentrated in three major centres: Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu. It will maintain a mobile reserve unit to respond to emergencies. In the Force Commander's judgement, the 15,000-troop strength is the minimum viable force level for continued implementation of the present mandate and the initiation and execution of a safe and orderly closure of the mission if this is decided by the Security Council.

16. With respect to security during the period of withdrawal, recent incidents at Belet Uen and Balad, in which UNOSOM personnel were attacked and assets looted, indicate that the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets could be difficult and dangerous in some areas. In the worst-case scenario, UNOSOM forces would have to withdraw in face of hostile action by Somali factions and/or widespread banditry, which would prevent the use of commercial air and sea transport. In order to cope with this threat, it will be necessary for Member States to provide UNOSOM with the support required to extricate personnel and equipment safely from Somalia. I have accordingly approached several Member States who possess the naval and air assets required to reinforce UNOSOM during the critical withdrawal phase, whether or not such withdrawal is carried out under hostile conditions. Such assets would have to include naval elements with fire support and sealift capabilities, as well as military aircraft. In this connection, the Government of Italy has informed me that it is prepared to make available five to six ships and 300 to 400 marines for that purpose. I am expecting further contributions from other Governments. While hoping that its withdrawal can proceed smoothly, UNOSOM must prepare for the worst-case scenario. It is my estimation that a secure and orderly withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets will require a period of between 60 and 120 days, depending on security conditions.

17. Every effort will need to be made to ensure that the withdrawal of the Force is properly coordinated under the authority of the Secretary-General. The security of the personnel of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as those of UNOSOM, will depend critically on an orderly and well-coordinated process, with a single, clear and undisputed chain of command.

18. Lastly, the manner in which a final withdrawal of UNOSOM II is executed will have important implications for the future deployment of United Nations forces on peace-keeping missions.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

19. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/239 of 24 March 1994, provided financial resources for the maintenance of UNOSOM II through the period ending 30 September 1994 at a monthly rate of $77,442,517 gross ($76,382,417 net).

Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of UNOSOM II in accordance with the recommendations set out in paragraph 22 below, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of UNOSOM II.

20. In this context, it may be useful to recall that the Security Council had agreed to the establishment of the Trust Fund for Somalia pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems and the Somali police. The total cost of this programme is estimated at $19.08 million, while cash contributions of only $8.08 million have been received in respect of the police training programme. It is anticipated that the shortfall in funding the programme would amount to approximately $11 million by March 1995. In view of the Organization's inability to attract adequate voluntary contributions for the Trust Fund, it may be necessary to utilize resources provided for UNOSOM from assessed contributions to meet the urgent needs of the police training programme.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

21. In my recent reports to the Council, I have repeatedly had to state that the process of national reconciliation has not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area and that security has been progressively deteriorating, especially at Mogadishu. The commitments that the Somali leaders had entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration were not being carried out. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify.

22. The protracted political impasse has created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on in its efforts to help Somalia emerge from its present chaotic condition. The presence of UNOSOM II troops has had limited impact on the peace process and limited impact on security in the face of continuing interclan fighting and banditry. The Council has already decided that the mission of UNOSOM II should end in March 1995. If the Council maintains this decision and all UNOSOM II forces and assets have to be withdrawn, time will be required to ensure that the withdrawal takes place in a secure, orderly and expeditious manner. As indicated in paragraph 16 above, this may take as long as 120 days. It may also require extensive air and sea support from Member States and it is important that the availability of such support is confirmed as soon as possible. In the light of these considerations, I recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate until 31 March 1995.

23. It should not, however, be assumed that there will be no progress in the process of national reconciliation. On the contrary, I have instructed my Special Representative that, during the new mandate period which I hope the Security Council will approve, he should maintain to the full his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation, at least to the extent of agreeing to establish a transitional government. In the event that progress can be made in this direction, I shall not hesitate to revert to the Security Council with recommendations for the continuation of some United Nations

presence in Somalia beyond March 1995 if that is justified by the overriding objective of restoring effective government.

24. It will be especially important to maintain unified command and control if the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia has to be carried out in hostile circumstances. Any unilateral attempt by troop-contributing States to protect or extricate their contingents will be more likely to deepen the problem than to solve it. In such delicate situations, a breakdown in command and control can prove catastrophic. The Council is accordingly asked to urge troop-contributing States to respect the unity of command and control under the authority of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the UNOSOM Force Commander.

25. The five-month extension here recommended will give the Somali leaders time to begin consolidating any positive achievements which may arise from the ongoing process of political reconciliation. I hope that the Somali leaders, faced by a strong and overwhelming desire on the part of the people of Somalia for peace and reconciliation, will finally find the inspiration to make peace. There is no other solution for the people of Somalia after the years of civil strife which have brought so much suffering and which have frustrated the efforts of the international community to help restore stability.

26. The international community has provided generous assistance to help overcome the worst aspects of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. While humanitarian organizations are committed to continuing their operations, it must be made clear that they can only do their work if adequate security arrangements are in place. The Somali leaders will bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of international and national relief personnel and their assets both during and after the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops. If, in the coming weeks and months, agreement were to be reached on the establishment of a transitional government and civil and administrative institutions, the work of humanitarian organizations and the much delayed transition to reconstruction and development would be facilitated. This positive scenario, however, remains for the time being only a hope and humanitarian organizations will continue to rely on the support of UNOSOM troops. It cannot be excluded that, following the withdrawal of UNOSOM, Somalia will plunge again into anarchy and chaos, the responsibility for which will rest squarely on the shoulders of its leaders.

27. The establishment of a viable and acceptable peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community cannot impose peace on the people of Somalia; it can only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there. Such assistance, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely. But reaffirmation of the Security Council's decision that the UNOSOM II mandate should end in March 1995 will not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Should the Somali authorities succeed in creating and maintaining favourable security conditions, the United Nations and the international community can continue to play a role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia, thus consolidating the achievements of the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM. The United Nations could also retain a certain presence after the withdrawal of UNOSOM, to continue assisting the Somali political organizations and factions in the process of national reconciliation. However, the feasibility of international assistance of this kind will be very much dependent on the degree of security prevailing in the country.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/1167
14 October 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SEVENTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 911 (1994) of 21 April 1994, under which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 22 October 1994. This report provides an update on events in Liberia since my last report, of 26 August 1994 (S/1994/1006), as well as recommendations for the planning of future United Nations peace-keeping involvement in Liberia.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

A. Mission to Liberia of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

2. In my last report (S/1994/1006), I noted my increasing concern about the recent evolution of the situation and the absence of progress in the peace process in Liberia. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send to Liberia a fact-finding mission, headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, as Special Envoy, to review the situation, in consultation with my Special Representative to Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, with a view to assisting me in determining options for the future United Nations role in facilitating the peace process in that country.

3. During his mission, from 16 to 26 August, the Special Envoy met, inter alia, representatives of the Liberian National Transitional Government, the leaders of the factions and other prominent Liberians. He held consultations with the Field Commander of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Major-General John Inienger, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Eminent Person for Liberia, Reverend Canaan Banana. He also met the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and President Henri Konan Bedie of Côte d'Ivoire.

4. The main findings of the Special Envoy were the following:

(a) The governance of Liberia has been seriously affected by the inability of the five-member Council of State to reach consensus on most issues and by the lack of resources available to the Government to administer the country;

(b) The factions have not shown the commitment and political will required for implementation of the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272, annex). The command and control difficulties within the factions have contributed to the instability of the security situation and to the lack of success of the disarmament process. Furthermore, the flow of arms and ammunition to the various factions has added to the crisis;

(c) A number of significant questions in regard to the electoral process remain unanswered, including the electoral system to be adopted, the repatriation of refugees, and resources required to carry out the elections;

(d) The limited financing available to ECOMOG has been a significant factor in hampering the group's ability to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. ECOMOG has not been able to provide security for unarmed UNOMIL military observers in accordance with that Agreement and agreements reached between the United Nations and ECOWAS.

5. The Special Envoy pointed out that a number of lessons have been learned over the past year in regard to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and that, on this basis, the United Nations and ECOWAS could introduce improvements to the initial concept upon which the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOWAS was based. In this connection, he made the following recommendations on the future role of UNOMIL in Liberia:

(a) The United Nations and ECOWAS should consult on the latter's future strategy for ECOMOG, and on the role of UNOMIL in relation to that strategy;

(b) The political support of the international community for the regional peace-keeping efforts undertaken by ECOWAS in Liberia should be accompanied by the substantial financial support which ECOMOG needs to be able to carry out its responsibilities effectively;

(c) Given the security situation in the country and the fact that ECOMOG cannot provide the necessary protection for UNOMIL unarmed military observers, UNOMIL should be reduced to about one third of its present authorized strength of 368 (including engineering and medical support elements);

(d) With regard to internal security, the issue of a national army should be addressed and donor Governments should provide technical assistance and other resources necessary for the formation of a new army.

6. In conclusion, the Special Envoy pointed out that since Liberia is a small country, with a small population, the world does not seem to pay much attention to the suffering of its people. He stressed that while this was to some extent understandable, experience had shown elsewhere that failure to mobilize the necessary resources at an early stage might well lead, later on, to even more costly operations. He also pointed out that, if left unchecked, the crisis in

Liberia would undoubtedly affect the stability of its direct neighbours - as it is already doing - as well as the stability of West Africa.

7. Several significant events took place, shortly after the Special Envoy left Liberia, and these have affected the peace process. First, the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, convened a meeting of the leaders of the warring factions on 7 September at Akosombo, Ghana, to review the continuing delays in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The meeting was attended by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah and a delegation of General Roosevelt Johnson, representing both wings of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and General Hezekiah Bowen, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Although invited, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) declined to attend the meeting. Representatives of the Liberian National Transitional Government, OAU and the United Nations were present as facilitators. The meeting culminated in the signing, on 12 September, of a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement. Although General Johnson's wing of ULIMO did not sign the agreement, he sent a letter to the Chairman of ECOWAS on 2 October, informing the Chairman of his acceptance of the agreement.

8. Secondly, the Liberian National Conference, a citizens' initiative, convened on 24 August to deliberate on the many aspects of the peace process. After extended sessions, lasting until 3 October, the Conference adopted a set of resolutions concerning the peace process and suspended further consultations for a period of two months, after which time it plans to reconvene to assess progress made in regard to disarmament and demobilization.

9. Thirdly, a dissident group within the Armed Forces of Liberia attempted to stage a coup against the Liberian National Transitional Government on 15 September. The attempted coup was successfully foiled by ECOMOG.

B. Akosombo Agreement

10. The objective of the Akosombo Agreement was to add further detail to those aspects of the Cotonou Agreement which were too general or, for other reasons, had proved deficient in their implementation. The Agreement reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement as the only framework for peace in Liberia. It sought to strengthen the role of the Liberian National Transitional Government in governing the country during the transitional period by giving it a more central role in the supervision and monitoring of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. In this regard, it also stated that all decisions of the Council of State should be made on the basis of a simple majority, as opposed to the Cotonou Agreement's provision for consensus, which had left the Council unable to reach decisions. Nominees to the Council of State would be changed, with each of the signatories to the agreement (AFL, NPFL, ULIMO) appointing one new member. The remaining two members, representing unarmed Liberians, would each be appointed by the Liberian National Conference and jointly by ULIMO and NPFL. Participation in the Transitional Legislative Assembly would be broadened by adding 13 representatives from the various counties.

11. In regard to military aspects, the Akosombo Agreement called for the immediate re-establishment of the cease-fire and provided more details concerning its implementation, the disengagement of forces and the responsibilities of the factions with regard to the assembly and disarmament of combatants. It provided for a more realistic package of incentives for demobilization, including arrangements for internal security and planning for a new national army. The Agreement foresaw that if disarmament and demobilization took place according to the agreed schedule, general elections could be held by October 1995.

12. The Akosombo Agreement also further outlined the peace enforcement powers of ECOMOG, and, in so doing, provided a more central role to the Liberian National Transitional Government. It specified that should any faction or group refuse to desist from acts in violation of the Agreement, the Transitional Government, in collaboration with ECOMOG, would have the power to use the necessary force available to assure compliance. Furthermore, under the Agreement, the Transitional Government would conclude a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS.

13. The conclusion of the Agreement coincided with an upsurge of fighting in and around Gbarnga, the headquarters of NPFL, NPFL being attacked by ULIMO-Kromah and the coalition of LPC, ULIMO-Johnson, AFL and NPFL breakaway ministers. This attack, according to some reports, was carried out with the clandestine support of some elements within ECOMOG.

14. Soon after its signing, the Akosombo Agreement became engulfed in controversy as members of the Liberian National Transitional Government and various Liberian interest groups called its validity into question. Reservations were expressed regarding the credibility of the signatories who, while negotiating at Akosombo, were also engaged in military confrontation on the ground. Given the breakdown of command and control within the factions, doubts were also raised regarding the capacity of those who signed the agreement to deliver on their commitments. In addition, the provision permitting the factions to change their nominees in the existing Council of State and in the Cabinet of the Liberian National Transitional Government was strongly criticized.

15. In view of the reactions to the Akosombo Agreement, the Chairman of ECOWAS sent a delegation to Monrovia on 17 September and, thereafter, invited prominent Liberian civilians and representatives of the Liberian National Conference to meet him at Accra on 18 September. The purpose of those meetings was to explain the rationale behind the Agreement and to discuss issues of concern which created opposition to it. As a result of those consultations, opposition to the Akosombo Agreement has reportedly diminished. To date, however, there has been no movement towards its implementation.

C. Liberian National Conference

16. The Liberian National Conference, like the Akosombo Agreement, reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement as the only framework for restoring peace and ensuring good governance in Liberia. Like the Akosombo Agreement, it sought to enable

the Liberian National Transitional Government to play a more central role in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement.

17. The Conference made a number of important recommendations regarding disarmament, governance and the electoral process, which converge with the Akosombo Agreement and could serve to advance the peace process. The Conference called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, deployment of ECOMOG throughout the country, comprehensive disarmament and demobilization within a 60-day period, and a series of punitive actions, including enforcement against those parties that failed to comply. The Conference recommended the establishment of a Disarmament and Demobilization Compliance Committee to monitor progress. It also recommended the establishment of a Peace Enforcement and Demobilization Fund, calling on the international community to mobilize resources for ECOMOG and on the Liberian National Transitional Government to contribute $1 million to the fund. Like the Akosombo Agreement, the Conference also highlighted the importance of a reconstituted national army and, in this connection, called for the reorganization and restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia during the transitional period.

18. As regards strengthening the ability of the Liberian National Transitional Government to govern the country, the Conference, like the Akosombo Agreement, called on the Council of State to adopt its rules of procedure quickly. It also called for the Transitional Legislative Assembly to be expanded by an additional 13 persons, representing each of Liberia's counties. The most significant point of divergence between the resolutions of the Conference and the Akosombo Agreement is that the Conference called for the retention of the existing members on the Council of State, conferring upon the Chairman the functions of Head of State, while the Akosombo Agreement permitted the factions to review the status of their appointees and to effect changes in the current membership.

19. With respect to the holding of elections, both the Akosombo Agreement and the Liberian National Conference concurred on a similar time-frame, with elections scheduled to take place around October 1995. However, while both the Cotonou and the Akosombo agreements were silent on the system to be adopted for the elections, the Conference proposed that the existing system, based on absolute majority, be retained for electing the President, Vice-President and Senators, with a change to proportional representation for elections to the House of Representatives.

20. The Conference recognized the role of the Chairman of ECOWAS in facilitating the peace process and called on him to continue consultations with and among Liberians in his search for peace in the country.

21. The attempted coup by dissidents within the Armed Forces of Liberia came at a time when the Liberian National Transitional Government was seeking to restore the army to its constitutional status. This decision was supported by the Liberian National Conference, which called for the reorganization and restructuring of AFL to reflect geographic and ethnic balance. Decisive action by ECOMOG in terminating the coup attempt has been followed by the partial disarming of AFL in its barracks at the Barclay Training Centre and at Camp Schefflin. However, it has been reported that some AFL elements may have joined LPC and/or ULIMO-Johnson in their efforts against NPFL. Relations between AFL

and the Liberian National Transitional Government have been further complicated by the attempt of the Chairman of the Council of State to remove the current Chief of Staff, who has refused to step down, supported by his nominated replacement and the AFL high command.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Situation on the ground

22. As indicated in my report of 26 August (S/1994/1006), in July 1994 a coalition of forces was formed by AFL, LPC and ULIMO-Johnson. Reports indicated that the principal objective of the coalition, supported by NPFL breakaway ministers in the Liberian National Transitional Government, was to defeat Charles Taylor and capture Gbarnga. Around mid-August, troops began to congregate in the Bong Mines and Kakata area, planning a move against Gbarnga. There are reports that some elements of ECOMOG (see para. 13 above), as well as some prominent Liberians, may have supported those efforts.

23. Charles Taylor's departure from Liberia on 6 September to attend the Akosombo meeting exacerbated the breakdown in NPFL command, thereby providing the opportunity for Alhaji Kromah's wing of ULIMO to attack Gbarnga and take control of Taylor's headquarters on 8 September. At this point, on 9 September, 43 unarmed United Nations military observers and six non-governmental organization personnel were detained by NPFL. The breakdown of command and control in NPFL-held areas and the taking of Taylor's headquarters at Gbarnga provided the coalition forces with the opportunity to launch a series of attacks against Taylor's forces in the northern and eastern regions of the country.

24. Over the course of the past few months, a number of counties in the south-eastern part of the country have come under the control of LPC. NPFL now seems to control parts of Nimba and Bong counties, as well as some parts of northern Grand Gedeh and Margibi. ULIMO-Johnson is still in control of Grand Cape Mount, Bomi and lower Lofa counties and has repelled recent incursions on Tubmanburg by ULIMO-Kromah, reportedly assisted by some elements of ECOMOG. Upper Lofa continues to be under the control of ULIMO-Kromah. Margibi county, especially between Kakata and Konola, is an area of intense fighting between NPFL and coalition forces, as the latter attempt to move northward towards Gbarnga.

25. According to some reports, the various factions continue to receive arms. There are also allegations of complicity on the part of some ECOMOG elements with the warring factions, particularly in regard to the military activities of coalition forces against NPFL. The fact that these allegations persist constitutes an impediment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

26. In recent weeks, ECOMOG has suffered casualties from ambushes by both NPFL and ULIMO-Johnson in the Margibi area. Civilians have also been killed by land-mines planted in an apparent effort to disrupt the advance of coalition forces.

27. Overall, the military situation remains confused, with groups aligning and realigning themselves depending on their short-term interests and the breakdown of command and control within the factions. The situation in Liberia is

reaching the point where warlords, without any particular political agenda but with the control of a certain number of soldiers, are seeking territory for the sake of adding to their own claim to power. Reports indicate that the fighting is likely to persist both within NPFL and between NPFL and rival factions until control of Gbarnga is consolidated. The current fighting in Liberia is small-scale bush fighting. The results are not large military victories, but deaths mostly of civilians, the decimation of entire villages and the breakdown of any semblance of law and order. Most of the fighters are not well trained, but are young men and boys, often with little choice but to be manipulated by the various warlords.

B. UNOMIL operations

28. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement and the UNOMIL concept of operations, unarmed United Nations military observers were to be deployed together with ECOMOG troops which were to provide their security. Given ECOMOG's logistic difficulties, UNOMIL began its deployment before ECOMOG. In so doing, UNOMIL sought and received the commitment of the factions to ensure the security of its military observers. The first months of such deployment went smoothly. ECOMOG soon followed the UNOMIL deployment pattern in some areas, including Gbarnga in the northern region. However, in July of this year, because of the already deteriorating security situation, especially in the western region, UNOMIL deployment was reduced from 29 to 21 team sites.

29. On 9 September, NPFL elements detained 43 unarmed UNOMIL military observers and 6 non-governmental organization personnel at nine sites in the northern and eastern regions, confiscating their transport, communications and most other equipment. This occurred soon after Charles Taylor's headquarters was taken by ULIMO-Kromah. It is felt that the detention of those personnel may have been a premeditated action on the part of NPFL (1) to use the observers as a shield against attacks by renegade NPFL forces or rival factions, and (2) to secure reliable communication and transportation facilities from UNOMIL and non-governmental organizations to further their war efforts.

30. Immediately after the crisis began on 9 September, UNOMIL undertook round-the-clock contacts with faction representatives, NPFL interlocutors, neighbouring countries and ECOMOG in order to secure the release of those detained. On my instructions, my Special Representative personally informed Charles Taylor that the United Nations held him responsible for the welfare of the UNOMIL military observers and non-governmental organization personnel being held in his area and demanded their immediate release and the return of their property. I also sent a message to the Chairman of ECOWAS, stressing ECOMOG's responsibilities regarding the security of UNOMIL personnel and urging him to exert pressure on Taylor to release those detained and to remind the other factions of their responsibilities under the Cotonou Agreement to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

31. On 14 September, 33 United Nations military observers were released and found their way to relative safety. An attempted helicopter rescue of the United Nations military observers stationed at Harper was aborted when the helicopter was shot at by NPFL elements and forced to leave the area after

rescuing 2 of the 12 observers detained there. On the same day, the ECOMOG contingent from the United Republic of Tanzania located at Gbarnga attempted to move with six UNOMIL military observers and six non-governmental organization personnel to Monrovia. When the convoy was between Konola and Kakata in Margibi county it was ambushed by elements of ULIMO-Johnson. Two Tanzanian soldiers were killed (a third later died from his wounds), seven were wounded and four were captured by ULIMO-Johnson troops. UNOMIL was able to airlift the United Nations, non-governmental organization and some ECOMOG personnel from Konola to Monrovia. However, further attempts to reach Kakata were aborted when the Tanzanian battalion was ambushed by ULIMO-Johnson. The troops eventually all reached Kakata, but the contingent was looted of its arms and equipment by NPFL in the process. Among the material looted by NPFL was a container of 492 weapons which had been handed over earlier by disarming combatants and was located at the Konola encampment site.

32. By 18 September, all military observers and non-governmental organization personnel had been released. The conduct of the observers under detention was exemplary in every respect. However, some of them, especially those held at Harper, were mistreated, beaten and terrorized by those who had detained them. NPFL has retained all of UNOMIL's transport, communications and other equipment, and, except in a few cases, observers were not permitted to carry personal items with them when they were released.

33. Given the breakdown in the cease-fire and the fact that, as experience has shown, ECOMOG cannot provide security for unarmed UNOMIL military observers, UNOMIL is unable, at this time, to carry out many of its mandated activities. As a result, all UNOMIL team sites have been evacuated except for those in the Monrovia area. It has also been decided to reduce, as a temporary measure, the personnel of UNOMIL from its authorized strength of 368 (including engineering and medical elements) to approximately 90 observers. Accordingly, as at 12 October, the military strength of UNOMIL stands at 190. Some observers have been transferred to other United Nations peace-keeping operations. This temporary reduction in the military component will be matched by a commensurate reduction in the civilian staff.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

34. Since my last report, the suffering of the population in rural Liberia has significantly increased. The turmoil that has followed the factional fighting over the past several weeks has resulted in some 200,000 persons being uprooted from their places of temporary or permanent residence. In the counties of Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Lofa, Grand Bassa, River Cess, Nimba and Maryland, UNOMIL overflights have confirmed that whole towns and villages have been evacuated and their populations decimated. The insecurity has resulted in the closure of all major roadways and terminated all forms of communication in rural areas. Displaced persons and refugees who have fled to Monrovia and across the borders of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire tell of the horror of indiscriminate killings, torture, rape, destruction of property and looting of personal effects. Refugees also report that thousands of other Liberians have sought refuge in the forested areas and are unable to move because of the insecurity.

35. At Nzérékoré, Guinea, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that, since 14 September, food aid and other assistance has been provided for over 45,000 newly arrived refugees. That is expected to increase further as the fighting in Bong county continues. At Tabou, Côte d'Ivoire, UNHCR also reports that over 30,000 new refugees have been registered during the same period.

36. Because of insecurity, international and local relief organizations located in Liberia have not been able to deal with the growing tragedy inside the country and this has had disastrous consequences for those in need. For example, before the fighting, the World Food Programme provided nearly 4,000 metric tons of food each month for approximately 420,000 suffering Liberians in Nimba, Margibi and Bong counties. These resources were distributed by five relief agencies. Insecurity has now reached levels that make it impossible for the movement of relief supplies, including across the border from Côte d'Ivoire, leaving thousands without access to the assistance on which they depend to cover their basic needs.

37. Many of the emergency relief projects of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in water, sanitation, child trauma counselling and immunization have been interrupted by the fighting. In Bong county, over the past several weeks, UNICEF has lost nearly $1 million worth of drugs and supplies through looting of warehouses. Local non-governmental organizations still present in the area do not have supplies to distribute. In addition, water projects, schools, health centres and hospital sanitation projects have been abandoned.

38. The Phebe hospital, the major secondary health care institution serving Bong county, has been ransacked and looted. As a result of the fighting at Gbarnga, some 30,000 residents had sought sanctuary near the hospital. During the last week of September, fighters attacked and killed several hospital workers and internally displaced persons. Survivors have fled to the bush, and no official report on their overall condition has since been received. UNOMIL is seeking the approval of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire for assessment missions to their border areas where the majority of refugees are currently located. The missions will include members of the United Nations and the non-governmental organization community. Information gathered will facilitate decision-making and refine emergency assistance strategies to be carried out upon the cessation of hostilities.

39. Since the commencement of renewed hostilities, humanitarian relief agencies, the United Nations system and UNOMIL have lost over 80 jeeps and trucks, tens of thousands of gallons of fuel, hundreds of tons of rice, beans and other relief items, communications equipment and supplies and materials worth several million dollars. The practice of looting transportation and communication assets and supplies is aimed at restocking and re-equipping the fighters to sustain the offensive of their factions. Almost all international relief operations have ceased, except at Buchanan and Monrovia. Whatever little humanitarian assistance is still available is being administered by the national staff of the relief agencies.

40. It is estimated that about one half of the international personnel of relief organizations have left Liberia as a direct result of the insurmountable

difficulties and impossible conditions for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Several staffers have taken up duties across the borders in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea to support ongoing efforts to assist the growing numbers of refugees. However, this is a temporary palliative since such stocks as have not been looted have run dangerously low. There is also no near-term prospect for resupply of food and other assistance given the present dangerous conditions and the increase in the numbers of suffering persons. Public appeals to the factions for the creation of zones of tranquillity and a cessation of hostilities have gone unheeded, as have calls for respect and sanctity of facilities such as hospitals and health centres.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

41. The General Assembly, by its resolutions 48/247 A and 48/247 B of 5 April and 29 July 1994, respectively, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in the amount of $23 million gross for the mandate period ending 22 October 1994, for the maintenance of UNOMIL. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of the Mission beyond 22 October 1994, at the reduced strength indicated in paragraph 33 above, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of the Mission.

42. As at 10 October 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to $5.8 million. In order to provide UNOMIL with the necessary cash-flow, a total of $2 million has been borrowed from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund. This loan remains unpaid. Outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 10 October 1994 totalled $1,416 million.

43. With regard to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement on Liberia, as at 10 October 1994, voluntary contributions received amounted to $17.8 million, of which disbursements totalling $14.5 million have been authorized.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44. The political, military and humanitarian developments of the past month have left Liberia in a desperate state. Long-term peace and stability in the country require genuine reconciliation between all elements of society. The Liberian National Transitional Government, the factions and the people of Liberia need to focus on political accommodation to stop the country from sliding deeper into chaos. In this regard, I support the initiatives taken by President Rawlings and the resolutions of the Liberian National Conference to strengthen the authority of the Liberian National Transitional Government in managing the administration of the country. I call on the Transitional Government to take a more active role in facilitating national reconciliation and I urge all Liberians to take concrete steps towards that end. The Transitional Government, the factions and the other interest groups must remember that it is the civilians, especially those outside the main population centres, who are the most vulnerable to the suffering caused by this conflict.

45. It is obvious that the peace process has stalled. At the ECOWAS summit, held at Abuja on 5 and 6 August, President Rawlings indicated that if there was no progress by the end of the year he would be obliged to consider withdrawing the Ghanaian contingent from ECOMOG. Nigeria has reportedly reduced its presence in ECOMOG while Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania have indicated that they may both withdraw their contingents from the operation. It should be emphasized that the frustration of ECOMOG troop-contributing countries derives both from the lack of financial resources to sustain the operation and from the lack of progress in the peace process to justify their sacrifices. A withdrawal or significant downsizing of ECOMOG in the face of the growing breakdown of law and order in the country will have serious consequences both for Liberia and for the subregion.

46. Reports from all quarters suggest that there can be no military solution to this conflict. The ability of the factions to wage war has undoubtedly been sustained by the continuing supply of arms and ammunition to them. This must stop. I am confident that ECOWAS member States will continue to use their good offices to ensure that the factions are denied any form of support so as to bring the fighting rapidly to a halt. As the ECOWAS summit at Abuja reminded member States, the arms embargo must be implemented rigorously. It should be borne in mind that continuing hostilities in Liberia will undoubtedly affect the stability of the subregion as a whole.

47. In view of the need to consult with ECOWAS on its intentions for ECOMOG and in order to support the recent initiatives by its Chairman, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, I have decided to dispatch a high-level mission to consult him about the respective roles and responsibilities of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, taking recent developments into account. This review will seek to determine how best the international community can continue to assist Liberia in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIL for a period of two months to allow the high-level mission time to conduct its work and present its conclusions to me. After consideration of its findings, I shall be in a position to make the appropriate recommendations to the Council on the future role of UNOMIL in Liberia.

48. The quest for peace in Liberia can be successful only if the Liberians demonstrate that they are ready for a genuine national reconciliation based on mutual respect and accommodation. However, while the responsibility for peace in Liberia lies primarily with the Liberians themselves, the fact is that the lack of adequate material support by the international community to the regional effort through ECOMOG has made it more difficult to assist the Liberians in advancing the peace process.

49. In closing, I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer, and to all the military and civilian personnel of UNOMIL. I should like to express my admiration especially for those observers who were detained; they have proved their commitment to peace in Liberia through their commendable behaviour under very trying circumstances. I should also like to thank the Government of Côte d'Ivoire for its assistance in securing the safe release of the detained United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel.

UNOMIL DEPLOYMENT
as of October 1994
Mission Headquarters UNOMIL
Regional Headquarters UNOMIL
Airport Team
Seaport Team
Investigation Team
Cantonment Team
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
LIBERIA
Atlantic Ocean
Western Region
Northern Region
Central Region
Eastern Region
LOFA
BONG
NIMBA
BOMI
GRAND CAPE MOUNT
GRAND BASSA
RIVER CESS
GRAND GEDEH
SINOE
GRAND KRU
MARYLAND
MARGIBI
MONTSERRADO
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Irié
Kailahun
Pendembu
Vahun
Yeala
Zorzor
Nzérékoré
Yekepa
Sanniquellie
Danané
Pujehun
Kongo
Naama Camp
Ganta
Lougatou
Bo
Sulima
Tiene
Kle
Gbarnga
Tubmanburg
Bong Town
Butlo
Robertsport
Lake Piso
Konola
Toulépleu
Todee
Kakata
Tapeta
Monrovia
Tobli
Towai Town
Cale Town
Spriggs Payne Airport
Harbel
Roberts Int'l Airport
Sos Village
Lac
Zwedru
Scheiffelin
Buchanan
Dubwe
Taï
Kaobli
Greenville
Kodeke
Nemeke
Bilapo
Grand Cess
Plibo
Ouaté
Tabou
Harper
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October 1994
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Cartographic Section